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Abstract
Background: Patient-reported outcomes (PROs) are frequently used for medical decision making, at the levels of
both individual patient care and healthcare policy. Evidence increasingly shows that PROs may be influenced by
patients’ response shifts (changes in interpretation) and dispositions (stable characteristics).
Main text: We identify how response shifts and dispositions may influence medical decisions on both the levels of
individual patient care and health policy. We provide examples of these influences and analyse the consequences
from the perspectives of ethical principles and theories of just distribution.
Conclusion: If influences of response shift and disposition on PROs and consequently medical decision making are
not considered, patients may not receive optimal treatment and health insurance packages may include treatments
that are not the most effective or cost-effective. We call on healthcare practitioners, researchers, policy makers,
health insurers, and other stakeholders to critically reflect on why and how such patient reports are used.
Background
Medical decisions at the individual patient (micro) level as
well as at the healthcare policy (macro) level increasingly in-
volve patients’ self-reports. These patient-reported outcomes
(PROs), such as health-related quality of life (HRQoL), can
only be provided by patients. For example, pain, fatigue, diffi-
culty performing tasks, satisfaction, and overall quality of life
reflect patients’ highly personal experiences. The emergence
of PROs is the result of a more patient-centred approach in
healthcare and research. Moreover, treatments increasingly
yield comparable clinical outcomes such as survival, while
PROs may vary widely.
All data reported by patients themselves may be sub-
ject to unmeasured influences. We focus here on two
types of such influences that have not been given due
attention. The first is response shift, which is defined as a
change in the meaning of one’s self-evaluation, as a result of
changes in internal standards, values, and/or conceptualization
of the PRO [1]. These shifts are often induced by health-chan-
ging events, such as falling seriously ill or undergoing treat-
ment. For example, a patient undergoing chemotherapy that
causes severe fatigue may change her internal standard for fa-
tigue severity as a result of adaptation. Consequently, her
scores may indicate lower levels of fatigue than would be ex-
pected, given the impact of the chemotherapy [2]. Thus,
whereas these response shifts are often a sign of adaptation,
they may distort the interpretation of changes in PRO scores
over time.
The second type of unmeasured influences is dispos-
ition, referring to stable characteristics that people ex-
hibit across circumstances and time, e.g. personality.
There is ample evidence that people have a disposition
for certain attributes that influence PROs, e.g. optimism/
pessimism, denial/catastrophizing, and feeling happy/un-
happy [3]. Patients’ dispositions affect individual self-
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evaluations and may lead to differences in PRO results
among patients with the same health state [4].
In this paper we define ‘health state’ as the level of ‘statis-
tically normal biological functioning’ [5], using the biomed-
ical definition of health as the absence of pathology [6]. The
biomedical perspective aims to distinguish people’s health
from their own standards and preferences, which may be
adaptive and culturally informed [7]. This thus enables us
to theoretically distinguish the contribution of people’s
health states to the reported HRQoL from the contribution
of response shifts and dispositions.
Currently, the potential influence of response shifts and
dispositions on medical decision making is only taken into
account to a limited extent - and usually only implicitly - in
consultation rooms, and not at the level of healthcare policy.
Consequently, medical decisions may be taken on insuffi-
cient grounds and hence may be suboptimal. At the micro
level, patients may not receive optimal treatment, as argued
below. At the macro level, basic health insurance packages
may include treatments that are not the most clinically ef-
fective or cost-effective. At present, it is unknown which de-
cisions may be influenced and in what ways. Therefore, here
we aim to identify the possible influences of response shifts
and dispositions on PROs that have unintended conse-
quences for medical decision making. To illustrate these in-
fluences, we provide hypothetical scenarios at the individual
patient and policy level. We analyse these examples from
three ethical perspectives for the micro level and two ethical
theories of distribution for the macro level, to clarify which
consequences are problematic – either because they are det-
rimental to individual patients or to society as a whole.
Main text
Patient-reported outcomes in clinical studies
Clinical studies - including PROs - form the basis of medical
decision making, both in the consultation room and on the
policy level. Response shift may systematically influence PROs
in several types of clinical studies [8]. In cross-sectional studies,
response shifts induced by events in the past may result in
higher or lower PROs than would be expected based on pa-
tients’ health states. During prospective cohort studies, patients
may undergo new response shifts that lead to an underestima-
tion or overestimation of health changes over time. Similarly,
in randomized controlled trials (RCT) and, consequently, in
cost-effectiveness studies, the compared treatments may in-
duce different degrees or directions of response shift in the
same or even in different PROs. As a consequence, treatment
effects may be underestimated or overestimated. For example,
health deterioration due to illness progression or treatment
may require adaptation by patients. As a result, a greater re-
sponse shift may be induced by such a treatment than by
treatments resulting in less health deterioration. This is illus-
trated in the following scenario.
Scenario 1
An RCT in patients with metastatic gastric cancer is con-
ducted to compare treatment with a doublet of cytotoxic
agents followed by a third cytotoxic agent upon progression
(regimen A; standard care) with a combination treatment
with a triplet of cytotoxic agents (regimen B). The survival
outcomes of both treatments turn out to be similar, but at
follow-up, health states for group A are slightly better. More-
over, patients in group B experience more acute side effects
during treatment, including neutropenic fever. This results
in a greater response shift for group B than for group A. At
follow-up, these acute side effects have disappeared. The
stronger response shift in group B results in higher reported
HRQoL scores than in group A, even though their health
state is slightly worse, as is shown in Fig. 1.
Disposition may also influence PROs in clinical stud-
ies. For example, optimism may lead to higher HRQoL
scores than would be expected based on health state,
Fig. 1 Health states and reported HRQoL after treatment with regimen A versus regimen B (Scenario 1)
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and rigidity may lower the changeability of HRQoL and
thus influence conclusions about the effects of treat-
ments. Furthermore, patients with a certain disposition
may agree to participate in studies more often than other
patients. Dispositions are not likely to influence the results
of RCTs and consequently of cost-effectiveness studies, as
group differences at baseline are due to chance. However,
in cross-sectional or prospective studies, disposition may
systematically influence PROs if groups of patients have
different dispositions that are related to the outcome, i.e.
if a disease is associated with a certain disposition. This is
illustrated in the following scenario.
Scenario 2
A cross-sectional study is conducted to compare HRQoL
of two groups of patients with congenital heart disease:
pulmonary valve stenosis and Marfan’s syndrome with
mitral valve stenosis. Research suggests that psycho-
logical dispositions that negatively impact HRQoL may
be part of the phenotype of Marfan’s syndrome [9]. This
could result in Marfan patients reporting lower levels of
HRQoL than patients with pulmonary stenosis, given the
same health state. As a result, the health state of Marfan
patients may be systematically underestimated.
Medical decision making in the consultation room: ethical
principles
As shared decision making (SDM) is becoming more im-
portant, patients’ self-evaluations and preferences are in-
creasingly taken into account [10]. In this context,
healthcare practitioners may inform patients about pub-
lished PRO data to support their decision making. Thus,
response shifts and dispositions may influence SDM to
the extent that it is informed by self-reports. Below, we
will discuss different types of influences and provide ex-
amples with consequences from an ethical perspective.
Three ethical principles
We use three principles for moral reasoning in bio-
medical ethics that are relevant for the level of indi-
vidual patient care: nonmaleficence, beneficence and
respect for autonomy [11]. The first principle, nonma-
leficence, supports avoidance of harm to the patient
and is based on the ancient maxim, ‘First, do no
harm’. In many cases, this principle is considered to-
gether with the principle of beneficence, for example,
in weighing the benefits and risks of a certain treat-
ment for a patient. The second principle is benefi-
cence, and refers to acting in the best interest of the
patient and promoting goods such as health and well-
being. This includes relieving, lessening, or preventing
harm, such as pain and suffering, disease, disability,
and death. The third is respect for autonomy. This
principle implies respect for the patient’s capacity for
self-determination, i.e. respecting and supporting au-
tonomous decisions of the patient. In medical prac-
tice, this means that healthcare practitioners usually
present treatment options and make recommenda-
tions. Patients, in collaboration with their healthcare
practitioners, make (informed) decisions about accept-
ing or refusing treatments, partly based on personal
values and beliefs [12].
The fourth principle, i.e. justice, may also be at stake at
the level of individual patient care, in the sense of equal
treatment among the patient populations of individual
healthcare practitioners. However, we did not include this
principle as we consider it less relevant for individual pa-
tient care. For healthcare practitioners, over- or under-
treatment of a patient is problematic as such, and not only
in relation to the care provided to other patients. Neither
is distributive justice considered relevant. In most West-
ern countries at least, in the consultation room, healthcare
practitioners are not concerned with the just allocation of
resources in healthcare, but rather with providing good
healthcare for each individual patient.
Influences of response shift and disposition on SDM
We can distinguish three types of influence of response
shift or disposition on SDM. First, they may have influ-
enced published PRO results that are used in the decision-
making process (for an example and its ethical analysis,
see Table 1). Second, response shifts and dispositions may
influence patients’ own self-reports. These self-reports
may be provided by questionnaires or symptom diaries, or
informally, in response to a physician’s enquiries. Third,
response shifts and dispositions may also influence pa-
tients’ preferences for or against certain treatments.
Table 2 provides a scenario combining the second and
third type of influence and its ethical analysis.
Decisions in healthcare policy: ethical theories of
distribution
On the macro level, PRO data from clinical studies are
used for decisions in healthcare policy. Below we discuss
different types of decisions that may be influenced by re-
sponse shift and disposition, and analyse examples from
an ethical perspective.
Two ethical theories of distribution
We use two of the ethical theories of distribution that
are relevant for the macro level and frequently guide
health policy decisions in Western European countries:
classical utilitarianism and fair equality of opportunity.
Classical utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory usually
associated with the work of the philosophers Jeremy Ben-
tham and John Stuart Mill. It states that actions are just
when they maximize ‘utility’, usually defined as wellbeing,
welfare, or happiness. According to Mill’s account of
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‘hedonistic’ utilitarianism, decisions should lead to the
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, i.e.
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain.
When applied to healthcare, utilitarianism implies
maximizing total (expected) utility within the boundaries
of limited healthcare resources, regardless of how re-
sources and utility are distributed [15]. People may differ
in how much utility they can ‘derive’ from the same
amount of resources (‘capacity to benefit’). For example,
one patient might benefit more from a certain treatment
than another patient, in terms of health or wellbeing
[16]. Following health economics, we take peoples’ valu-
ations of their health-related quality of life as the ‘good’
that should be maximized, indicating the relative desir-
ability of these health states. The utility of a medical
treatment is thus the valuation of the incremental qual-
ity of life, combined with the duration of the quality-of-
life levels.
‘Fair equality of opportunity’ is the egalitarian account
of Norman Daniels, applying Rawls’ ‘Theory of justice’
to healthcare. It considers the protection of the ability of
individuals to participate in the political, social, and eco-
nomic life of their society [17]. According to Daniels, by
keeping people close to ‘normal functioning’, healthcare
can provide people their fair share of the ‘societal nor-
mal range of opportunities’ that reasonable people would
choose in that society. Applied to decisions in healthcare
policy, it is this functioning that is taken into account
and not the impact of disease and treatment on patients’
wellbeing, happiness, or other types of utility [18]. Thus,
fair equality of opportunity implies that every patient
should have access to a certain minimum level of health-
care, to promote normal functioning and thus protect
fair equality of opportunity [19]. This also implies that
people with severe illness or disabilities who nevertheless
report high levels of life satisfaction or quality of life can
still appeal to support in obtaining a fair share of an op-
portunity range, because they have an objective loss in
their range of capabilities and opportunities [20].
Healthcare policy decisions
We distinguish between two types of healthcare policy
decisions that may be affected by response shifts and
dispositions. The first type is devising treatment guide-
lines for specific conditions, to designate which treat-
ment is preferred. For some conditions, these decisions
are based on data from RCTs (see Table 3).
Table 1 Scenario 3: Influence of response shift on medical decision making (micro level)
Scenario 3 Ethical analysis: nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy
An oncologist discusses published PRO data from an RCT (see Scenario 1)
with a patient with metastatic gastric cancer. Based on the PRO data, the
patient prefers regimen B (the triplet of cytotoxic agents) over regimen
A, because QoL scores of this group are higher at follow-up. Whether or
not the patient would undergo the same response shift as the study
respondents is not certain. Not knowing about the response shift causing
the higher HRQoL scores means that the patient’s decision is not fully
informed. Consequently, the patient may be overtreated, resulting in
unnecessary side-effects and lower health state at follow-up than
regimen A would have yielded.
The example is problematic from the perspective of nonmaleficence. At
the moment of the decision, no harm is done yet. However, the
overtreatment that may be the consequence, leading to a worse health
state, equals ‘doing harm’. In addition, the principle of autonomy is at
stake as well, since the decision is not fully informed. Whereas possible
differences between study groups and the individual patient - such as
gender, age, and possibly lifestyle - are ideally taken into consideration,
influences of response shifts and dispositions are less well-known and
rarely discussed in SDM. However, the patient is still included in the
decision making and informed about options, expected benefits and risks.
Therefore, this may be considered only a minor violation of the
autonomy principle, especially as it is not possible to tease out all health
changes from response shift and disposition in PRO data.
Table 2 Scenario 4: Influence of disposition on medical decision making (micro level)
Scenario 4 Ethical analysis: nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy
A cardiologist sees a patient with stable coronary artery disease and low
ischemic burden, and consequently no indication for coronary
angioplasty. The patient reports four occurrences of chest pain per day.
Due to high trait anxiety, he is not only vulnerable to over-perceiving
heart symptoms, but also inclined to catastrophize the occurrences of
chest pain. [13] Furthermore, his anxiety about the chest pain results in a
strong preference for angioplasty over continuing conservative treatment
(medication). Finally, the cardiologist decides to refer the patient for
angioplasty, leading to medically unnecessary treatment [14] and
consequently unnecessary medical risks.
The disposition of the cardiac patient influences his self-evaluation as well
as his treatment preference (requesting angioplasty). The consequent
unnecessary treatment is in conflict with both the beneficence and
nonmaleficence principles. As there are no health benefits that outweigh
the health risks of the intervention, the treatment is not in the best
interest of the patient and the health risks imply possible harm. Whereas
the treatment may comfort this anxious patient, leading to a (presumably
temporary) improvement in self-reported health or wellbeing, it would
have been better to refer the patient for treatment of his anxiety.
Concerning the principle of autonomy, the situation does not seem
problematic as it is the patient’s own self-evaluation and preference that
informs the decision leading to sub-optimal care. However, the patient is
probably unaware of the influence of disposition on his self-evaluation.
Not being able to take this into account raises the question of whether
the decision is optimally informed and, consequently, autonomous.
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In the second type, PRO data are used in cost-effect-
iveness analyses to decide which treatments should be
included or excluded in the basic healthcare package.
Response shift and disposition may influence these deci-
sions at two points. First, as explained above, response
shifts may influence PROs, e.g. EuroQol (EQ-5D) health
questionnaire data. Second, such PRO data are combined
with ‘utility tariffs’, to calculate the utility of a treatment in
terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). Utility tariffs
are valuations of health states, indicating the relative desir-
ability of these health states. Utility is anchored at 0 (as
bad as death) and 1 (as good as perfect health). For rea-
sons of democratic legitimacy, most national guidelines
require that utility tariffs are estimated from the public’s
perspective. These tariffs thus reflect how the general pub-
lic values health states as described by patients. Generally,
valuations by the general public are lower than patient val-
uations, which may be affected by response shifts induced
by disease experience – one of the known causes of this
discrepancy [21]. However, the size of the discrepancy be-
tween valuations from the public and patients may vary,
depending on health states and patient groups. For ex-
ample, there are indications that larger discrepancies may
be expected for patients with worse health states [22]. As
a result, the cost-effectiveness analyses may lead to differ-
ent conclusions than if the utility scores of patients had
been used (see Table 4).
Conclusions
Response shifts tend to mitigate or amplify changes in PROs,
and differences in disposition may lead to different PRO
scores among people with the same health state. This may
influence medical decisions at both the levels of individual
patients and health policy, leading to suboptimal care.
The question arises of how serious the consequences
are if these influences are not considered. The answer is
not only dependent on empirical data and the ethical
theory applied but also on the health concept used. As
Haverkamp et al. have shown, different practices may re-
quire different concepts of health [25]. In this paper, we
have used the biomedical concept of health. Other,
broader conceptions of health have been proposed and de-
bated, including positively phrased definitions of health
such as ‘overall physical, mental and social wellbeing’ [26]
and ‘the ability to adapt and self manage’ [27]. From these
perspectives, healthcare should aim to improve biological
functioning as well as to improve overall wellbeing and
adaptation. Thus, in these latter approaches, the influences
of response shifts and dispositions on PROs may be viewed
as beneficial. However, as with the biomedical perspective,
these influences still need to be teased apart from actual
health states. We believe that patients may be entitled to
know about the influences of response shifts and disposi-
tions on PROs that inform their treatment decisions.
Healthcare practitioners may need to learn about their pa-
tients’ dispositions and how patients adapt to their disease
in order to provide good care. Moreover, patients who have
adapted to symptoms and functional problems or who are
not inclined to report them may still benefit from treating
these burdens of disease.
Also on the level of healthcare policy, medical decision
making could benefit from taking into account the influence
of response shift and disposition. The ethical analysis of the
scenarios presented above also show that decisions about
guidelines and reimbursement of treatments may not be fully
informed. Not only reflecting on the possible influences of
response shift could enhance the decision making; the differ-
ent ethical perspectives and conceptions of health and their
differential implications for healthcare policy also need to be
considered.
Pertinent questions arise from a biomedical perspec-
tive towards health. For example, how many decisions
are influenced by response shift and disposition, and
result in sub-optimal care, health inequities, or
Table 3 Scenario 5: Influence of response shift on guidelines (macro level)
Scenario 5 Ethical analysis: Utilitarianism Ethical analysis: Fair equality of opportunity
An RCT is conducted to compare the effects of
bypass surgery (open heart surgery) and
angioplasty (catheter intervention) on frail
patients. In the longer term, both treatments
produced the same health status. However, as
bypass surgery requires several months of
recovery and thus adaptation, it may induce a
greater response shift than angioplasty. As a
result, after 6 months the bypass group reports
higher levels of HRQoL than the angioplasty
group, even though their health states are similar.
This shows that the guidelines may be
suboptimal, with an unwarranted preference for
bypass surgery, leading to suboptimal care:
unneeded treatment with unnecessary medical
risks.
Since utility should be maximized, influences of
response shifts or dispositions on self-evaluations
are not an issue as such. The situation is
problematic because bypass surgery is more
expensive than angioplasty and has more
medical risks, in this case without greater health
benefits. However, the higher HRQoL scores due
to response shift may justify the preference for
bypass surgery, despite the medical risks.
Nonetheless, especially when the costs and risks
of bypass surgery are substantially higher, one
might question whether these ‘extra’ resources
would not be better spent on other healthcare
or even services other than healthcare. Indeed,
this may yield a larger increase of total utility in
the broad sense, i.e. the wellbeing of the
population.
The situation is problematic. The guideline
may lead to medical risks of unneeded bypass
surgery, which could cause a loss in the range
of capabilities and opportunities of this
patient group.
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inefficient use of healthcare resources? Does it make
a difference ethically if under- or over-treatment is
caused by the influences of response shifts or disposi-
tions? What is more problematic: unnecessary treat-
ments for demanding patients, or under-treating
patients who downplay their symptoms?
Given the importance of the patient’s perspective in health-
care and research, and the fact that PROs cannot be replaced
by clinical measures, it is our intention to improve rather than
criticize the use of PROs. Our aim is to raise awareness of the
potential influences of disposition and response shifts on med-
ical decisions via PROs. We call on healthcare practitioners,
researchers, policy makers, health insurers, and other stake-
holders to critically reflect on how and why such patient re-
ports are used. For example, is the aim to assess the impact of
a treatment on patients’ wellbeing, or on their health state?
We would particularly encourage healthcare practitioners to
ask patients more probing questions about symptoms and
functional problems, or how they respond to a certain treat-
ment. Existing SDM training programmes for healthcare prac-
titioners could incorporate the subjects of response shift and
dispositions to provide them with the knowledge and skills
needed to explain such influences to their patients. It is also
our hope that this reflection will stimulate empirical research
into the effects of response shift and dispositions on medical
decision making. In cross-sectional and prospective studies,
dispositions could be assessed to investigate their influence on
PROs and possibly enable the correction of these influences in
future research. Considering response shift, as a first step, we
need to investigate which types of treatments are likely to in-
duce response shifts. Knowledge about the PROs that are
most susceptible to response shifts [28] and statistical tech-
niques distinguishing response shifts from actual health
changes are available [29]. We thus have the tools to start the
investigation, with the aim of improving the use of PROs in
medical decision making.
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Table 4 Scenario 6: Influence of response shift on inclusion in healthcare package (macro level)
Scenario 6 Ethical analysis: Utilitarianism Ethical analysis: Fair equality of opportunity
A cost-effectiveness (costs per QALY) study
is carried out among patients with Crohn’s
disease. Treatment A (standard care) is a
colostomy, after which patients need to use
stoma bags. Treatment B delays the need for a
colostomy for 6 years, has no side-effects, and
costs EUR 53,000. The total costs of stoma care
for 6 years (group A) are estimated at EUR 7000.
Treatment B thus costs EUR 46,000 more than
standard care.
Utility is determined from the perspective of the
general public. Based on a scenario describing
aspects of life with a stoma, the general public
estimates life with a stoma at a value of 0.8. [23]
Treatment B would increase this utility from 0.8
to 1.0 for 6 years. Treatment B would thus yield
0.2 × 6 = 1.2 QALY, at incremental costs of EUR
46,000.
Thus, treatment B has a cost-effectiveness of
EUR 38,000 per QALY, which is acceptable in
most Western countries.
However, the health valuations by patients with
colostomies are significantly higher, at 0.92, [23]
probably partly due to response shift. If the
patients’ own utility scores had been used, the
incremental utility would only be 0.08 for 6
years, leading to a smaller incremental value of
0.08 × 6 = 0.48 QALYs. Combined with the
incremental costs of EUR 46,000, the cost-
effectiveness would be EUR 96,000 per QALY,
which might not be acceptable in many
Western countries. [24]
Thus, using the valuations of the general public,
treatment B would be reimbursed, while it
would not if patients were asked to value their
own health states.
The situation is not problematic. Using utility
tariffs derived from the general public instead of
the patient group for cost-effectiveness analyses
does not conflict with a utilitarian point of view.
Utilitarianism does include the option to let
society determine the desirability or
undesirability of health states. In other words, it
may be left to the general public to determine
how ‘bad’ it considers certain health states to
be, and the amount of money it is willing to
spend to improve these health states.
The situation is problematic in the sense that
only health benefits that improve functioning
should be taken into account in decisions for
reimbursement, instead of self-reported HRQoL
(including influences of response shift and
disposition) or valuations of health states
(utility). Thus, using utility tariffs is always in
conflict with the theory of fair equality of
opportunity. The more utility tariffs (derived
from the general public) differ from the actual
health states of patients, the more problematic
it becomes.
In this case, the patients’ valuations would be
higher than the valuations derived from the
general public, partly due to response shift.
Therefore, using the valuations of the general
public is less problematic than using patient
valuations. In this particular example, using
valuations of the general public leads to
reimbursement of treatment B, with six extra
years of functioning without having to use
stoma bags. Thus, the patients’ range of
capabilities and opportunities is optimally
protected.
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